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COMMENT
In the Comment which follows Professor Baldwin presents a brief
for an extremely creative Supreme Court. In contrast to those who
suggest limiting the function of the Court, either by subject matter or
by judicial restraint, the author would have it protect the compact
upon which the community is based, by taking an active role to insure
that the compensation implied in the compact flows in fact not only to
the community but to the individual.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
A CREATIVE CHECK OF INSTITUTIONAL MISDIRECTION?
FLETCHER N. BALDWIN*
At some point, as nations mature, an institution, individual, or
group takes hold to set the tone and ground rules of the theoretical
compact between individual, community, and government. In most in-
stances there is a long term evolutionary process which continually refines,
through trial and error, the rights and obligations of citizenship on the
one hand, and the human rights-benefits which flow to the individual on
the other. The construction which implements this notion of dual com-
pensation is at times due to an abrupt shift in "public interest" policy.
Such a shift usually results in community confusion, and there is no
fool-proof system which can avoid the confusion or contradiction. As
history illustrates, many theoretically successful individual-community
compacts have been polluted in practice by just such a problem.
Each community should be concerned with searching for a system
of checks that enhance, although perhaps not necessarily insure, human
rights compensation by the community. All too often governments forget
why they are governing, just as individuals forget their societal re-
sponsibilities. At such a stage of mental lapse there must be an institution,
or institutions, empowered to assert its prestige in the controversy, in an
attempt to re-establish the balance of legitimate community/individual
expectations.
This article will examine one such institution-the United States
Supreme Court. The emphasis is upon a limited aspect of the work of the
* Professor of Law, Holland Law Center, University of Florida on leave, Fulbright
Professor of Law, Makerere University College, Uganda.
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Court, that of final authoritative interpreter of the entire community
process, with the human rights provisions of the Constitution as the
frame of reference. In this regard, the standing of the Court has suffered,
needlessly, in recent years,1 and this article is an appeal to community
and individual alike to assist the court in reaffirming its creative role.
FAIRNESS-A VITAL COMPONENT OF MUTUAL 'COMPENSATIONO
In the late twentieth century the non-conformist has sharpened our
awareness that mutual compensation theory, which would bind individuals
and protect the community, is neither functioning effectively nor being
articulated accurately by the authoritative decision-makers. Questions
about the extent of human and community rights occupy considerable
debate time. Yet when protests about possible civil liberties (human
rights) violations are brought before the public, society seems confused
as to the basis of consideration, judgment, and solution. These issues
require deliberation and understanding. They are too important to go by
default to either side of a particular confrontation; they are too funda-
mental to be left to the interpretation or manipulation of the political
party in power.
All claims, in vacuum, stand on an equal footing. The fact that
each man is born supports the concept that an individual claim is as
important as any other single claim. However, contemporary man does
not live alone. Whether he would prefer to live alone is not the question;
the fact is that he does not and cannot live in isolation. As a result claims
are not and cannot be absolute. Because pre-ordained needs do not exist,
each claim by the individual and government must be justified.
The justification is based on the idea of a community.4 Men have
found it desirable and necessary to live together. It is inevitable that
individuals must restrain some of their own ideals and pursuits for the
1. See Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 AM. B.J. 919 (1969).
2. This general idea is developed fully in Barnhart, Himnan Rights as Absolute
Claims and Reasonable Expectations, 6 AM. PHIL. Q. 335 (1969).
3. See, e.g., D. WALKER, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (The Walker Report) (1968).
See also T. GuRn, E. H. GRAHAM, THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1969) ; Sib-
ley, Social Order and Human Ends: Some Central Issues in the Modern Problems, Po-
LITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 221-55 (D. Spitz ed. 1967).
4. For purposes of this article the following definition of Community is adopted:
A 'Community' is a group of people, organized in varying degree on a geo-
graphic basis and affected by interdependences or interdetermination in the so-
cial process by which they seek values. A more complete description of any
Community would outline the participants (group and individual), the range of
values sought, the situations or interaction, the base values at the disposal of
different participants, the strategies employed in different contexts, and finally,
the outcome achieved in the shaping and sharing of values.
McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, I GA. L. Rzv. 1, 4 (1966).
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good of the whole. The community necessity implies a degree of re-
sponsibility, that the individual serve the needs of the whole. For this
reason rules and regulations have been the community mainstay. Tribal
communities with their customary laws were rigid in their enforcement
of community values.5 Rules and regulations negate unworkable absolute
claims; however, they also imply that in agreeing to the negation man
insists upon the right to share in corporate rewards. The effective com-
munication of this idea as well as the idea of what is expected of man is
found in the community pronouncement.
The question of what is expected of individuals in a community has
developed through the idea of law.' On the other hand, to insure
compensation by the community, there has grown up a set of values to
be found, for example, in the Bill of Rights and the human rights
amendments to the Constitution. The compact theory has been formalized
with the "law of the land." But what are the compensating values and
through whose eyes do we examine them?' The organized society is a
fair focal point, but it is to be doubted whether the law as articulated and
practiced by the organized society in the late twentieth century is ac-
complishing its purpose of joining men together through common goals
and values. Is the law being vitalized and utilized as anything more than
a sanctuary for conformists regulated by a code of threats coupled with
the exercise of the force of society, or is it perhaps a body of predictions
as to how and when that force will be applied?' Is the law the sum of
specific principles articulated in the determination of controversies? Since
the goals of men reflected in the community idea must be communicated
has the law, traveling under the guise of human values, become merely a
set of rules established by the appointed authorities of a political unit? Is
it precedent or a dynamic instrument that promotes community and
individual expectation while preserving a degree of stability?' The
5. See generally M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEA OF BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE (1965).
See also R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1968).
6. See generally M. BARKUM, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS (1968).
7. Part II infra sets forth some of the questions that must be asked before one can
begin to understand the diverse opinions as to a definition of law. No one definition is
satisfactory but an all inclusive one might be helpful in raising questions:
Law is (1) a complex whole, (2) which always includes norms regulating
human behavior, (3) that are social norms, (4) the complex whole is orderly
and (5) the order is characteristically a coercive order (6) that is institutional-
ized (7) with a degree of effectiveness sufficient to maintain itself.
Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33 (Special Pub'l
the Ethnography of Law, L. Nader, ed., 1965). Compare Friendman, Legal Culture and
Social Development, 4 L. & Soc. REV. 29 (1969).
8. See 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1959).
9. See E. ESRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 366-411
(1936) ; Jones, The Creative Power and the Function of Law in Historical Perspective,
17 VAND. L. REV. 135 (1963).
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question is whether the implication of compensation, in the compact, as
implemented, is reciprocal.
To this problem, there are no simple answers. Several factors, how-
ever, seem clear. A community must apply its rules consistently and in
keeping with the human rights provisions of its constitution. Since the
community by its very nature makes demands, the individual can at least
in turn insist that the community demands be made in a consistent
manner. If man cannot depend upon the community to be consistent in its
demands and compensation, then the community is acting unfairly."
If there is any credibility to the compact theory, it is that responsibility is
universal; neither the individual nor the community can escape its
demands. Social support requires individual rewards," and without
mutual compensation the essence of the compact theory is destroyed.
Human rights are just and reasonable demands made within the
complete-social, economic, political and technological-community con-
text.'" If human rights are perceived as compensation, the demands re-
quire analysis not only from a community but also from an individual
expectation standpoint. The analysis, production, and distribution of
human rights is, however, open ended. Men have a great variety of needs,
wants, and desires which cannot be arbitrarily limited. The environmental
factors affecting matters of fairness must be considered. What guidelines
are to be established for distribution? Who sets the guidelines? Where the
community condemns poor education or a poor standard of living and
simultaneously denies opportunities to those with a poor education or a
poor living standard on emotional grounds, then it is clear that the com-
munity is in part renouncing the compact. Although this may be said to
be peculiarly a political and democratic question, where the community
denies renouncing the compact the question becomes one of fair treat-
ment.13 But to "speak" of fair treatment, just as to speak of human rights,
is not synonymous with "possession." Community fairness requires
legitimate credentials. One cannot pronounce, even with the force of a
mob, authoritative human rights. A community's announcing "fairness"
does not establish it.
The exercise of self-styled human rights will not assure recognition.
A dispassionate agency lending constitutional support for particular
human rights must reaffirm the legitimate community/individual ex-
pectations. The agency has the continuing burden of making the moral
10. Barnhart, supra note 2, at 337.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 338.
13. Id. at 339.
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proclamation of human rights relevant to the community environment. If
unsuccessful, at least an authoritative agency has pointed out the com-
munity failures and predicament. The thinking of the agency must be
original and pliable just as the community is said to be creative and chang-
ing. The creativity implicit in the human rights community expectation
portion of the Supreme Court's work requires an intellectual freedom and
ability to give meaning to the conglomerate of cultural principles implicit
in the community compact concept. The ideal is that of mutual com-
pensation-mutual expectation.
THE NECESSITY FOR RESTRENGTHENING THE
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of the difficulties with the idea of the Court as an independent
body having the power to articulate, from a given set of circumstances,
the bounds of mutual compensation is its restricted (limited focus) frame
of reference. From what vantage point are claims and expectations to be
considered? Attention must first be given to fairness in deciding the
limits and extent of freedom of self fulfillment. However, community
concepts of self fulfillment which are generally reflected in the laws of
the community are confusing, they disclose many miens and a closet full
of hats. 4
The concept of law that binds a particular compact is utilized by the
community as its primary agent of (a) social control and (b) balancing
values where there are conflicting interests. The form that the law should
take has been proved and discussed by legal scholars for centuries. The
critical variable seems to be the content.
Professor Lon Fuller has pointed out that the content of law is a
moral question engulfing certain values which each community considers
as truly necessary and relevant to its continued existence. 5 This notion
implies a broad frame of reference for law. There are, however, con-
tinued attempts by scholars to insist that law to be "law" must be treated
narrowly, must refer to a fundamental resource. John Austin and H.L.A.
Hart have assumed the need for an intellectual maturity on the part of the
evolving society which demands the capacity for separating law from all
other types and degrees of social practice.' "
The various examinations inevitably disclose a legal-social obligation
dichotomy. To Austin, law is what the ruler says it is. His command is
14. M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 432 (1957).
15. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 152-86 (1964) ; Compare H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
16. See generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954
ed.) and H.L.A. HART, supra note 15.
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ultimate authority, the embodiment of the power of the state. Citizens
under such a structure are obliged to act when commanded to do so
where a legitimate rule controls. Such decisions are therefore enforced
from a position of power, not reason. For Austin there must first be an
identification of the rule. and the enforcement thereof. Moral obligations
are not the subject of sovereign enforcement. A high court would seem to
have very little creative duties in such a system. A one party state could
fit comfortably into the Austinian scheme.'
Hart, however, in attempting to refine Austin's theory developed
the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition, a power conferring rule,
requires a distinction between rules imposing duties and rules conferring
legal obligations.
Fuller argues that where social obligation becomes increasingly the
object of an explicit responsibility, a legal system is created. Again the
uncertainty lies in "the precise point at which a legal system can be said
to come into being."' 8 Professor Myres McDougal, in exploring this
point, notes that regardless of who the decision-makers are in a particular
set of circumstances, one thing is certain, the interest and control is found
beyond the written rules. "We are interested in decisions, what's done,
the consequences of the making and application of rules for human
beings."' 9 A decision on what is the law stems from competing demands.
The legal process should express the desires and goals of all members of
the community tolerating the legal system. The expectations cannot be
found in completed terms on a 1787 parchment.2"
The task of a contemporary interpreter is to examine and assess
this entire flow of prior communication for the closest possible"
approximation to the genuine shared subjectivities of our present
community members as to what their constitution really pro-
vides on basic issues.2 '
Professor McDougal agrees that the interpreter must take into account
the community's shared expectations. He points out that the decision
makers' primary goal is to act rationally in pursuing the primary
objective of interpreting and articulating genuine community values. This
17. See Georges, The Court in the Tanzania One-Party State, EAST AFRICAN LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 26 (G. Sawyer ed., 1967).
18. See L. FULLER, supra note 15, at 131.
19. McDougal, supra note 4, at 2.
20. See, e.g., Ferry, Must We Rewrite the Constitution to Control Technology?
SAT. REv., Mar. 2, 1968, at 50.
21. See McDougal, supra note 4, at 5.
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task requires an understanding and respect for human rights.22 The task
of the interpreter, in this case the court, must be considered in the context
of community process. The genius of the task, as set by Professor
McDougal, is that it takes into account the complexities of the various
community demands."
Social demands are fickle, fluctuating with the conditions of the
times. In the late nineteenth century the concept of the well-ordered
society was one that was free from as much government control as
possible.24 Industrialists in an economically struggling nation worked for
a central government which would encourage and protect trade, keep the
value of the currency high, and allow the capitalistic enterprises a great
deal of economic latitude.25
Until the period of depression in the late 1920's and 1930's, there
continued to be objection to government control. However, with the
occurence of the depression government control became a welcomed
intervention. Freedom from government restraint was traded for freedom
from hunger and unemployment.
The tradition of confusion as to what or who should govern and how
this governing should be carried out is reflected in the dilemma of
American democracy. On the one hand there is adherence to a con-
stitutional government with emphasis on the human rights of the in-
dividual and the limited powers of the government, the separation of
powers, a close watch over civil liberties, and protection against any
arbitrary encroachments by the state. Yet on the other hand, there is the
rule of the majority, the police power concept. Where the two conflict and
the community wishes to remain intact, an authoritative decision-maker
must be drawn into the dispute.2" Fairness requires an impartial and
reasoned set of credentials eminating from the decision-maker. But in
the final analysis why pin the hopes of the community on a court of last
resort?
THE DILEMMA: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND EARLY CONCEPTS
Edmond Cahn writing in The Great Rights" described this dilemma
as it was faced by the constitutional framers in trying to discover how to
incorporate a philosophical arbitrator into a practical setting. The im-
22. M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT
AND WORLD PU13LIC ORDER 35-77 (1967).
23. Id. at 27-34; see also 2 R. POUND, supra note 8, at 7.
24. See 2 R. POUND, supra note 8, at 120-21.
25. K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1967).
26. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, supra note 22, at 35-39.
27. Cahn, A New Kind of Society, THE GREAT RIGHTS 1-12 (E. Cahn, ed., 1963).
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mensely difficult task for the framers was hot so much articulation but
implementation. It was not new for a document or for national leaders to
articulate philosophic rhetoric that sounded like equality, justice, and
liberty.28 The United States Constitution embodied only the vague out-
lines of implementation of article III.
The idea of judicial review was not born with the Constitution. Lord
Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case"9 evolved a concept that was to live
much longer than the holding:
It appears that when an act of Parliament is against common
right and reason... the common law will control it and adjust
such act to void."
This language was employed as a rationale by the colonists to argue
against the Stamp Act."' It appears again in The Federalist No. 78
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed
to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature
in order, among other things to keep the latter within the limits
assigned to their authority. The interpretation of laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in
fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meanings as well
as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legis-
lative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation
and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words,
the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
of the people to the intention of their agents."
The new nation chose initially to adopt The Articles of Confedera-
tion. The document was a creature of the states, not of the people. Review
was not given to a national body. This document had a brief reign. The
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, for whatever reasons,
chose to ignore their task of rewriting the Articles. Instead, these delegates
produced the Constitution. The document itself, was in part a counter-
28. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967);
A. D'ENTREvES, NATURAL LAW AN HISTORICAL SURVEY (1965); CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2d ed., W. Andrews ed., 1963) ; L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND
HISTORY (1965).
29. 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (C.F. 1610).
30. Id. at 118.
31. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 141-50
(1958).
32. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, THE FEDERALIST 521, 525 (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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institutional check within the institutional framework.
Whether intended as broadly as interpreted is a matter of con-
siderable debate."3 The debate sometimes ignores the fact that the task of
implementing the ideal was assumed by the Court in part as a result of the
default of other institutions. This is not to say that the Court has ever
enthusiastically endorsed its role of "creative" implementor of community
credentials. Most of the post Civil War civil rights legislation died a
violent death at the hands of the Court. Furthermore, concepts of property
have permeated much governmental thinking from inception to modern
times. 4 The framers of the Constitution talked a great deal about grant-
ing rights to the people;"5 however, the Constitution was conceived for
the most part within a property orientation framework.
Irving Brant, writing in The Great Rights and later in The Bill of
Rights,"0 describes the key role such architects as James Madison played
in shaping the future of the United States. In planting the libertarian
spirit not only Madison, contends Brant, but most of the founders,
liberal and conservative alike, were ready and in fact did pin "their faith
on representative self government based on the great body of the
people.""1 This ideal seems to speak to the universality of man, not-
withstanding the fact that it reflected the needs and the hopes of the
few. 8
There were earlier signs of the American democratic spirit. For
Brant one such sign was the Declaration of Independence which en-
compasses rather than conflicts with the spirit of the Constitution."
The Declaration presented for all to read the case for the colonies against
the crown. Under certain clearly defined and specified circumstances, it
stated, the people have a right to revolt. Rebellion against established
authority is a serious matter, and the founders did not want the idea to
become too popular. Because the crown was unresponsive to the needs of
the colonies, the new United Colonial government would respond. The
Constitution set out methods of orderly change designed to prevent any
destruction of the nation.4" But this was only part of the Declaration. The
colonists did not merely argue that their list of grievances granted them
the right to armed revolution. They also contended that free men should
33. See generally F. MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1958), and R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1948).
34. See generally K. POLANYI, supra note 25.
35. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 33, at 1-44.
36. I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS ITS ORIGINS AND MEANING (1965).
37. See Brant, The Madison Heritage, THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 17.
38. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 33.
39. See Brant, supra note 37.
40. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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not be subjected to a system of government that did not embody the two
major human rights principles: liberty and democracy. A system was
devised that would fit this interpretation of the intent of the Declaration.
That intent, conceived in an earlier day, bore fruit in the Constitution.
It was incomplete, however, without effective implementation. When the
issue arose in Marbury v. Madison,41 the starting point was article III.
The difficulty for Chief Justice Marshall was that article III is not
complete in its description of the judicial power. But by combining
article III with article VI, the Supremacy Clause, Marshall was able to
establish the point that the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land
and that the Court, the Supreme Court, would stand as the last resort,
ready to insure the constitutional provisions involving the idea of
mutual compensation.42 Marshall was careful, as his successors would be,
in his wording of Marbury. He was aware of a basic tenet of the American
system, that the Court does not have the final say.4" The Court could not
"withstand for long an executive or legislative power that had the con-
sensus of the nation behind it.""' Judicial review built upon such a
flimsy foundation presents not only the weakness of the Court but also
its strength. Judicial construction can, as can mob violence and rule, undo
the compact. How does one know when the Court is performing its
definite task as authoritative decision-maker in the human rights arena?
In the 1933-36 era there were many who argued that the Court, "in con-
sidering itself the supreme economic authority" was performing a task
delegated by the people to the other branches of government.45
One must keep in mind that the main question for the Court, in this
context, must be to undertake "a disciplined, responsible effort to
ascertain the genuine shared expectations of the particular parties to a
community conflict."4" When the Court has ventured beyond this limited
task, in the early stages of the New Deal for example, not only could one
see a Court with little commitment to the concept of the individual first
in the mutual compensation scheme but one could also see its lack of
ultimate power. With a lack of ultimate power, the question of the
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury
v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
42. E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMocRATIc MAN 34 (1961).
43. I am discussing the educational role and not the enforcement aspects of judicial
review. See Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. CT.
REv. 127.
44. THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 9.
45. See R. JAcKsoN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 72 (1941), and Men-
delson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review, 103 U. PA. L. Rv.
295 (1954).
46. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, supra note 22, at 40.
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Court's assuming too much authority in the human rights field seems to
raise more emotional than practical issues. The relevant question should
be why would the Court refuse to act in a case involving a mutual
compensation conflict? The question involves genuine reflection upon
community needs and goals. The question requires an analysis of fairness.
To understand fairness one must study and analyze the impact upon the
individual of the community institutions. A crisis affecting human rights
is not solely a moral crisis-majority belief versus minority right being
the usual conflict-but also an institutional crisis." The institutional
structures that have grown up around the Constitution are rooted in the
failure of the community to respond with creative sensitivity to deep-
seated human rights issues. The failure can be seen in the political arena
as well as in mob scenes multiplying daily.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH
Have community expectations been unfair in practice? The rights
of persons living under our constitutional form of government are at
times illusory. 8 First, there is no unanimous agreement as to the general
values and goals of the community. Nor is there consensus with respect
to the forms the various societal institutions should assume. Self con-
cerns and vested interests tend to confuse the real purpose behind the idea
of mutual compensation-human dignity. Although the concept of human
rights has undergone considerable and complex alterations in the techno-
logical age,4" the initial consideration of individual in determining the
degree of allowable infringement has survived."0 What constitutes allow-
able infringement at times becomes confused and perhaps synonymous
with economic expectations. What, in fact, does the community want?
Luxury? Security? Where the wants conflict with human dignity, what
survives? Where other branches of government do not respond to these
questions in a fair manner, can they at least be examined in a dispassion-
ate judicial setting? These questions are basic to the whole compact
theory of mutual compensation. They are questions judicial in nature.
Herbert Marcuse argues that community goals of commodity so-
phistication at times cause want-blurring in some individuals." Com-
modities and the creation of more luxuries at times overshadow the
47. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
48. This point is forcefully made in Graves, The Revolt of Black Students, 1969
UTAH L. REv. 13.
49. J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 432-36 (1967).
50. See generally B. DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY 247-71 (J. Huntington, trans.
1967).
51. H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 7 (1967).
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desire to demand and accept the obligations of a libertarian society."
In this context the "individuals" become Riesman's "Other Directed
Man" ;5s their director being the commodity-directed institutional com-
munity. It was to this point that Marcuse alluded when he labeled the
logic behind institutional growth "totalitarian" which
[p]recludes the emergence of an effective opposition against
the whole. Not only a specific form of government of party
rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of
production and destruction which may well be compatible with
pluralism of parties, newspapers, 'counter-vailing powers'. . .."
Psychiatry can delve into man's most inner thoughts. Operant condition-
ing can establish patterns of response." Scientists talk about the creation
of a "superior race."" The national government can propose a National
Data Center to collect the most intimate information for governmeni
scrutiny in the name of efficiency without stirring up too much pro-
test.17 Why? Does the answer lie, in part, in the way the potential in-
trusion is presented? The presentation stresses progress. The presentation
implies that where every product is new and improved there will be little
room for poverty or infirmity.5" Poverty and infirmity continue, control
methodology improves."5 Community compromise has prevented these
issues from destroying individual goals.6" The potential is, however,
present. When the potential is finally realized, can a creative decision-
52. Id. 203-46. See also K. KENISTON, THE UNCOmMITTED 425-47 (1965).
53. D. RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1950).
54. H. MARCUSE, supra note 51, at 3.
55. Mee, The New Knowledge Industry, 10 InD. UNiv. REv. 10, 17 (Winter, 1968).
56. Experimentation has gained greater acceptance in recent years. Following
World War II it had fallen into disrepute as a result of the German "experience." But
today it is not uncommon to find those who urge genetic experimentation. See LIFE ScI-
ENcE LIBRARY, THE BODY 12 (1964). See also Lamborn, Social Control Through the Re-
c cnstiiution of Man, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 452 (1969).
57. See Ferry, supra note 20, at 51.
58. Utopian thinking is impractical and self-defeating, we therefore cling to a
technological empiricism that merely perpetuates the status quo . . . para-
doxically, then, we live in a society in which unprecedented rates of technologi-
cal change are accompanied by a fundamental unwillingness to look beyond the
technological process which spurs this change. Even those who are most con-
cerned over the future course of our society continue to conceive that course in
primarily technological terms, emphasizing quantity, comparisons, economic out-
put, and dollars and cents. And the imagination and commitment needed to de-
fine a future qualitatively different from the technological present are deflected
-even for those most concerned with out social future-by a series of specific
fallacies about the social process.
K. KENISTON, THE UNCOMMITTED, 430-31 (1965), see also Mee, supra note 55.
59. Lamborn, supra note 56.
60. Id. at 455-58.
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maker, free from confused rhetoric, readjust the concept of mutual com-
pensation? At that point the question is irrelevant, because the answer is
all too obvious. The questions at present, although emotionally stirring,
need responses from authoritative decision-makers with a degree of
creative flexibility. The task is difficult by its very nature. For the vast
majority the mutual compensation theory means that the social self, the
concern for conformity, dominates regardless of probable suppressed con-
cern for where one is going and why.6' The present demand by the
economic and political institutions for self-preservation considerations
center around and include as part of its terms conformity.2
Andrew Hacker contends that the majority has an outward mani-
festation of power, yet is powerless because there is a clear jurisdictional
division between policy that they can involve themselves in and policy they
will be excluded from. He argues that the demography of government,
public as well as private, is a continual, though subtle, manipulation of
the status quo.63
The notion that there are many counter forces in this country that
will institute checks upon government and economic institutional mis-
direction can lead to the undoing of the idea of a community/individual
compact. To rely upon "advertised" counter forces can result in a dilution
of the potential creative role of the Court. For example, the institution of
the main-line church in the United States, an "advertised" counter force,
represents the limited wants and desires of its parishioners. The ready
acceptance of the church greatly inhibits its prophetic participation, its
role as critic and gadfly. There are, however, winds of change revitaliza-
tion within the institution. There are also disturbing tensions and con-
flicts. The institution of the church is being challenged by individuals and
61. Andrew Hacker seems to suggest that the reason is probably that no one really
understands what Marcuse and others are trying to say. Where, for example, are our
self-styled Americanism purifiers?
It is not that would-be American censors are that much more tolerant for
we still have our ration of self-appointed loyalists ready to harass authors
deemed to be corrupting of the commonwealth. The difference is that our
watchdogs, whether governmental or entrepreneurial, are basically illiterate.
Once they get to give letter words their incapacity for comprehension soon be-
comes evident. Marcuse's security stems chiefly from the fact that most of our
own professional patriots have neither the training nor the intellect to understand
the implications of his analysis.
Hacker, Philosopher of the New Left, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 1968) (Book Rev.) at
37, col. 2.
62. Hacker, Freedom and Power, Common Men and Uncommon Men, 4 Nomos,
LIBERTY 308, 316-18 (Friedrich ed., 1962). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964). The concept of conformity flows through the works of Marcuse, Kenis-
ton, Ellul, and others. See also P. GOODMAN, GROWING Up ABsURD (1960) and W. OG-
BURN, SOCIAL CHANGE 180-86 (1966).
63. Hacker, supra note 62, at 319-20.
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small groups to engage in revolution. 4 At times the revolutionaries
utilize the same manipulation of the status quo of which they accuse the
church.
The university, entangled in relevant as well as irrelevant and
dangerous struggles seems to be one of the chief agents in the neutraliza-
tion of embryo counter-institutional forces. This neutralization is caused
in part by the very activists who oppose it. 5
State and federal legislatures-directly responsive, in theory, to the
wishes of the people,-cannot be considered as bastions of libertarian
idealism if past and present performance is any indication." This is not
to imply that official as well as unofficial authoritative agencies in the
community do not, at times, work effectively to insure human and com-
munity needs. Where there is a genuine sharing of values, community
expectations are being met without the resort to the Court for contempor-
ary interpretation of individual/community expectations. It is where
polarization occurs that enlightenment about human rights and public
order must be articulated. During times of deep stress the Court has been
accustomed to exercise its enlighting function. The Court, drawn into a
new era of "constitutional and social development," as an authoritative
decision-maker has the potential to effectuate clarification of the com-
munity goals.
Beset as we are by mounting external threats and deep internal
conflicts, not merely the kind of public order we can achieve
but even our very survival, may depend upon the wisdom with
which these problems can be resolved. The point I would em-
phasize, however, is that our inherited constitutional doctrine
imposes upon us no rigid, automatic solutions to these problems:
every interpreter confronted with one of these problems must
make a creative choice; the critical issue is with what enlighten-
ment about the requirements of common interest he makes this
choice.
7
64. Compare the various articles in the 1967 Symposium issue of The Great Ideas
Today, 'especially Cox, Why Christianity Must Be Secularized, THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY
1967, 8 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1967). See also H. Cox, THE SECULAR CITY
(1964); J.A.T. ROBINSON, THE NEW REFORMATION? (1965); D. PICHASKE, A STUDY
Boor ON THE MANIFESTO (1967); R. SHINN, TANGLED WORLD (1965), and P. TILLICH,
THEOLOGY OF CULTURE (1964).
65. Cf. C. KER, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (1963) ; K. KENISTON, THE UN-
COMMITTED (1965); Symposium, Youth 1967: The Challenge of Change, 36 AMER.
SCHOLAR 539-645 (1967) ; Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1965, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
66. See generally K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957) and H. MAR-
CUSp ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1967). See also Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Anti-
trust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965).
67. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1966).
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Extremism has left the Court little choice.68
THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN A "POSITIVE STATE"
In order to clarify community goals the 'Court as well as society must
understand the circumstances around which conflict revolves. The task of
trying to understand and articulate the comprehensive set of community
values in a given controversy is not one the Court has in the past been
willing to accept as a general task of judicial review. Yet, as Professor
Arthur S. Miller points out, there are several junctures in constitutional
development where the role of the Court in articulating principles has
caused a turning point, or to borrow his language, "milestones of con-
stitutional development."6 Such decisions as Marbury v. Madison"0
and Gibbons v. Ogden71 immediately come to mind as well as Brown v.
Board of Education72 and Baker v. Carr." Yet at many past junctures the
Court has not assessed the depth of the community goal commitment.
Present governmental "revaluation" of the task of the Court is a result of
one such juncture, President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal."' If a date
in history is ascribed to the beginning period it would have to be 1933-
36. The position assumed by the court as natural watchman of laissez
faire economics was successfully challenged by the New Deal. In winning
the battle, however, the idealism of the New Deal ideal lost the war. The
reversal of judicial review in matters "economic" was so complete that
today the Court continues to adhere to its 1936-37 procedural principle
that allows private as well as public "welfare" programs to proceed
without much fear of judicial evaluation.75 Evaluation is left to the
particular institution or the streets.
The structures erected by the New Deal to insure desirable individual
security had little outside control. Coupled with a persistent insistence
upon continuing on a legitimate capitalistic or commodity oriented course,
the New Deal was considered the vehicle through which more could share
68. See W. 0. DOUGLAS, POINTS OF REBELLION (1969).
69. See Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Posi-
tive State: A Preliminary Excursus Part One: On Candor and the Court, or Why Bam-
boozle the Natives?, 1967 DUKE L.J. 273, and Miller, Constitutional Revolution Con-
solidated: The Rise of the Positive State, 35 G.W.L. REv. 172, 173 (1966).
70. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
71. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74. See Miller, supra note 69, and Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living"
Constitution, 31 G.W.L. REv. 881 (1963).
75. But see Briar, Welfare from Below-Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare
System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 370 (1966), and Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emnerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
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in community rewards. Under a community concept of economic well
being, the federal legislative and executive, as well as state governments
and massive economic private sectors, were largely left to their own
devices in determining not only the economic growth and direction of the
nation but also who should br should not benefit from governmental and
corporate largess."0 This was the birth of the positive state, the com-
munity defining economic well-being, not by balance but by positive act.
Although seemingly in ideological conflict with the commodity idea, the
two were soon to join forces in diluting one of the real attempts by
government to aid all in the community.7" The marriage of the com-
modity oriented idea to the positive state has resulted in a structural
involvement in the control of economic planning. This marriage and
its offspring have had a profound effect upon the basic human rights
identified in the introduction.
The prospects of containment of change, offered by the politics
of technological rationality, depend on the prospects of the
Welfare State (positive state). Such a state seems capable of
raising the standard of administered living, a capability inherent
in all advanced industrial societies where the streamlined techni-
cal apparatus-set up as a separate power over and above the
individual's power-depends for its functioning on the intensi-
fied development and expansion of productivity. Under such
conditions, decline of freedom and opposition is not a matter of
moral or intellectual deterioration or corruption. It is rather an
objective social process insofar as the production and distribu-
tion of an increasing quantity of goods and services makes
compliance a rational technological attitude."
THE FORMULATION AND DEFINITION OF THE COMMODITY
ORIENTED POSITIVE STATE
The term "commodity oriented positive state" is utilized here to
mean "affirmative governmental responsibility" for economic security.79
76. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
77. For an analysis of the struggle between the court and President Roosevelt see
R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). For an abbreviated eco-
nomic overview of the New Deal see K. POLANYr, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 223-
36 (1967).
78. H. MARcusE, ONE DIMENSIONAL. MAN 48 (1967).
79. Instead of least government being best government, the intervention of gov-
ernment into socio-economic matters has made it possible for more people to en-
joy a higher degree of freedom. In broad constitutional terms, this is the ad-
vent of the Positive State, characterized by a government willing to further the
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It can be state or national affirmative action and includes, for example,
welfare programs, educational concern, permissive attitude toward cor-
porate employment benefits (such as taking over workmen's compensa-
tion) and licensing provisions. Prior to the New Deal Era, federal and
state governments adhered to the "hands off," negative aspects of govern-
ment control. The New Deal expressed, in reversing the role at the
federal level, governmental acceptance of responsibility for the maximiza-
tion of individual well being. The demand for food, for jobs, and for
security were met with program upon program aimed at insuring
economic stability. Although at the time the Supreme Court reflected the
policy of the negative state, there were isolated examples of judicial
support for embryo positivism. In Home Building and Loan Ass'n. v.
Blaisdell" the Court upheld a state mortgage moratorium law. In
Nebbia v. New York 1 the Court sustained price fixing legislation. For
the most part, however, the Court sought to retain the early concept of
laisses faire government by striking down positive legislation aimed at
economic well being. In 1935 the Court held legislation providing for a
code to govern the oil industry to be an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the President.82 In Retirement Board v. Alton R.
Co.83 the Court not only held the Railroad Retirement Act uncon-
stitutional, but also gratuitously condemned the entire effort made in
enacting such legislation. In Lousiville Bank v. Radford" the Court
unamimously declared the Fraizer-Lemke Act, relating to the relief of
farm mortgages, to be unconstitutional. In the most far reaching of its
day's work, the Court in Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States" held
the National Industrial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional."
well-being of the citizenry. Governmental programs evidencing this basic alter-
ation are largely legislative in origin, although some may be traced to the ex-
ecutive branch. The development, so far as its fullest realization is concerned, is
recent history. As for the Supreme Court, it is familiar history that the Jus-
tices at first resisted and then in the 1930's capitulated to the on-rushing wel-
fare principle. After about a century and a half of relative somnolence, in
which it did little or nothing that might be said to advance the cause of human
freedom, the Court in recent years has begun to assist in the process of maxi-
mizing liberty through government action.
Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 G.W.L. REv. 881, 891
(1963).
80. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
81. 219 U.S. 502 (1934).
82. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 389 (1935).
83. 295 U.S. 330 (1935). -
84. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
85. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
86. The National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), was an attempt to
establish, in part, rules of fair dealing with customers and to furnish labor certain guaran-
tees respecting hours, wages and collective bargaining.
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The Court continued to adhere to the doctrine of negativism until
1937, when after many complex factors developed,17 it reversed itself
and submitted to the growing demands for a positive state.88 The reversal
was so complete that from 1937 to the present date the Court rarely
intervenes into matters considered by it to be "economic in nature."8
However, with such a dramatic shift in ultimate decision making has
also come the rise of administrative government. The ideal, embraced in
the judicial scrutiny of governments of laws, gave way to the pragmatic
government of men.9" The pragmatism was based upon a "public interest"
orientation.9' The balance was struck in favor of the community not its
individual inhabitiants.
Charles Reich has pointed out some of the dangers that have evolved
as a result of the well meaning though unhampered "public interest"
orientation. He notes that the concept of property is changing so rapidly
that revisions in the methods of protection traditionally afforded the
individual must be considered. He argues that the "public interest"
orientation is in reality governmental largess." Because the government
is now the dispenser of wealth, whether that wealth be translated into a
license to drive a taxicab or to practice medicine, social security benefits,
missile contracts, or a television station license, mutual compensation must
be redefined. The resulting fiction seems to be that benefits are a privilege
granted by government and hence the mutual compensation concept, as
interpreted in the Constitution, must usually be surrendered in order to
receive the benefits of largess."3 The argument is that since most bene-
fits are not required governmental functions in the first instance, to
withhold or revoke or attach conditions or select the category of recipient
must be given wide latitude. Such programs, the supporters argue, cannot
be said to violate constitutional rights. 4
The proponents of this position point out that the "case or con-
troversy" requirement for judicial review takes the court out of con-
tention for a position of decision-maker in matters of broad governmental
87. See generally R. Jackson, supra note 45.
88. For a survey of the cases involved in the period 1935-1938 see C. SWISHERI,
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL'DEVELOPMENTS 938-44 (1944).
89. Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
90. See Miller, supra note 62, and Reich, supra note 62, at 733.
91. Reich, supra note 62.
92. Id.
93. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1959 (1960).
94. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1932). C. Reich points out that
the government considers its granting of "benefits" to be a "gratuity" thus not subject to
strict constitutional standards. Reich, supra note 62, at 740. Thus, the governmental frame
of reference in their granting of "gratuities" would keep them at the same constitutional
level as that of private corporate gratuities. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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largess. The Court must wait for "a proper case" and then the holding
affects only the parties to the litigation. In short the Court cannot focus
upon the broad societal issues because by its very nature the Court is not
designed for such an awsome task in a democracy.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION: AN INCOMPLETE Focus
Ordinarily, judicial recognition of a specific problem ignores the
broad complexities of the community process. Decisions of the Court
generally present an authoritative rule that more often than not fails to
delve into or become an integral part of the comprehensive social
process. 5 Fear of what the Court is doing is, in reality, fear of the pot-
ential, as yet unrealized, of the Court as creative decision-maker. When
the issue involves mutual compensation-fairness of the social process-
broad community expectations should weigh heavily upon the intellectual
deliberation of the Court. The argument supporting the "least dangerous
branch" thesis98 has no place here. There is a need, in an age of individual
awareness, for an authoritative yet creative decision-maker which can
clarify community goals, describe past trends in the social process,
analyze, dispassionately, community conditions affecting the parties in the
litigation, project future trends through critical analysis of behavioral
and social science studies, and create and evaluate policy alternatives.97
The task is complex and not readily acceptable. For example, the Court
has specifically recognized "academic freedom" as a constitutionally
protected right (state action questions aside). However, the nature of
judicial review produces an incomplete focus on the problem. The in-
complete focus ignores some of the most important issues steming from
the demand for academic freedom. Mr. Justice Brennan writing for the
majority in Keyishian v. the Board of Regents of New York (1967)98
said:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic free-
dom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
95. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to Le-
gal Study, 1 NAT. L.F. 53 (1956).
96. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Weschler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959). Compare Fuller,
An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (1966) ; Miller
and Howell, The Myth Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudications, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 501
(1959).
97. Professor McDougal's many works spell out in great detail the tasks required
of the Court. His recommendations are more important for the seventies than ever be-
fore. The ideas outlined in the text are found in McDougal, supra note 67, at 15 (1966).
They are expanded in, among other works, M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER,
THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
98. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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to the teachers concerned. That freedom is, therefore, a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.. "The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedom is no-where more vital
than in the community of American schools." The classroom
is peculiarly the "market-place of ideas." The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "cut of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authorita-
tive selection."
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the in-
tellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish
in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study, to evaluate
and to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.99
What has the Court said? Is there any identification of the con-
trolling rules or community prescription? Does the Court consider if
there have been institutional structures erected to prevent what, let us
say, an activist might consider a "meaningful exercise" of academic
freedom? Is there any attempt by the Court to recommend effective
means of regulating authoritative demands upon academic freedom?
What is the impact of such supportive rhetoric as that quoted above,
upon the attitudes of the antagonists? Have the underlying issues that
prompted Keyishian been explored? Has there been a creative evaluation
of policy alternatives? Can those interested parties to the broad con-
troversy adequately respond to statements about an academic freedom?
There is a barrier between the ability to act and the acting. Even the
most committed Supreme Court, perhaps the Warren Court, has been
handicapped by an incomplete focus. The difficulty lies, in part, in the idea
that the Court is ill equipped to go behind an action to detemine with a
great degree of scientific perception what has actually caused the dispute
99. Id. at 603.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and what measures need to be taken to correct a possible injustice."' 0 But
as Dean Pound points out:
Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scientific
is a means toward an end, it must be valued by the extent to
which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical process or
the strictness with which its rules proceed from the dogmas it
takes for its foundation. 1 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the problem in Zimmer-
man v. Board of Education of Newark.'°2 Public school teachers in the
state of New Jersey receive an annual contract. The first three years in
the typical probationary period with tenure granted or denied at the
beginning of the fourth year. In Zimmerman the plaintiff's contract was
not renewed at the end of his third year. He sued for reinstatement.
100. The one troublesome roadblock to judicial protection of academic freedom is
the confusion surrounding employee status. Cowan, Interference with Academic Free-
dora: The Pre-Natal History of a Tort, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 205 (1958). Is it a privilege
or a right? Much of the confusion stems from Mr. Justice Holmes' statement that a pub-
lic employee "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892). The United States Supreme Court has taken a different ap-
proach, although from the full text of McAuliffe it does not appear that Holmes meant
exactly what he said. The present Court considers the constitutional guarantees to flow
to public employees as well as to others. The position is summed up by Mr. Justice Clark
in Wieman v. Undergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
We are referred to our statement in Adler that persons seeking employment in
the New York public school: have no right to work for the State in the school
system on their own terms. . . . They may work for the school system upon
the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities in New York . . . To
draw from this language the facile generalization that there is no constitutionally
protected right to public employment is to obscure the issue, for, in United Pub-
lic Workers, though we held that the federal government through the Hatch
Act could properly bar its employees from certain types of political activity
thought inimical to the interests of the Civil Service, we cast this holding into
perspective by emphasizing that Congress could not enact a regulation provid-
ing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or
that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary
work. . . . We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does ex-
tend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary.
Id. at 191-92. Again in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Court re-
affirmed its position that there is constitutional protection for public employees, when
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority said:
We conclude that policemen like teachers and lawyers are not relegated to a
watered down version of constitutional rights. There are rights of constitutional
stature whose exercise a state may not condition by the exaction of a price.
Id. at 500. Couple these quotes with the language of the Court in Keyishian reaffirming
the constitutional nature of academic freedom, and it becomes clear that there is sufficient
authority to support judicial scrutiny of academic freedom violations.
101. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUm. L. REv. 605 (1908).
102. 38 N.J. 65, 183 A.2d 25 (1962).
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Although the New Jersey Supreme Court denied his claim, they struggled
with the problem.
As a general proposition, powers vested in local government
must be exercised reasonably and the judiciary will review local
action for arbitrariness. . . . The question is whether pro-
bationary employees are beyond that proposition.
The legislature intended wide latitude in the employing
authority to determine fitness for permanent employment. It
is clear that public employment may not be refused upon a
basis which would violate any express statutory or constitutional
policy. A simple example would be discrimination for race or
religion. But I am not sure such specific limitations are the only
restraints. If the employing agency, for an absurd example,
thought blondes were intrinsically too frivolous for permanent
employment, a court would find it difficult to withhold its hand.
But if we may inquire into "unreasonableness," it would
seem to follow that there must be a "reason," i.e. "cause" for
refusal to continue the teacher into a tenure status. That course
has its difficulties. It would not mean that the court would not
recognize a wide range of "reasons" or would lightly disagree
with the employer's finding that the "reason" in fact existed.
But it would follow that upon demand the teacher would be en-
titled to a statement of the grounds, with the right to a hearing
and to review as to whether the grounds are arbitrary in nature
or devoid of factual support .... 0 3
Does this mean that the state court and the United States Supreme
Court will or will not consider questions of a constitutional nature when
these questions arise in an academic setting? The question involves more
than a formalistic approach to legal obligations." The very nature of the
modern "multiversity" with its ponderous bureaucracy tends to confuse
the issue and compound the complexity of the fact situations in alleged
academic freedom violations." 5 It is no longer sufficient for the Court to
bind up the wounds of those hurt by the injustices of the community.
To ask that the Court continue to expand upon a creative course of
103. Id. at 79-80, 183 A.2d at 33 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
104. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 122-133 (1964). Cf. H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEIT OF LAW (1961).
105. See, e.g., Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 930 (1960) ; Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56 (1st D.C.A. 1966) and Levine,
Private Government on the Campus-Jidicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE
L.J. 1362 (1963). Cf., e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1961).
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action is not asking that the Court assume a new or dangerous role. Pro-
fessor McDougal again:
The suggestion is sometimes made that deliberately creative
efforts by judges and other authoritative decision-makers to
relate their choices to fundamental public order goals introduces
arbitrariness and uncertainty into decision. Exactly the opposite
would appear to be the case. Every experienced lawyer knows
that the rationality to allegedly 'neutral' or 'autonomous' rules
are in fact largely illusory. The discipline required in systema-
tically relating specific choices in public order goals by explicity
stated intellectual procedures might indeed both offer decision-
makers a better guarantee that their choices are appropriately
compatible with the goal values to. which they are committed
and afford the members of the general community greater as-
surance that their genuine expectations and common interests
are realistically and consistently taken into account." 6
The Court in Sheldon v. Tucker.°7 considered the broader community
interests. In Sheldon the Court struck down an Arkansas statute requiring
public school teachers to submit a list of all organizations to which they
belonged. The statute was attacked by a teacher in the Little Rock Public
School System. The evidence showed that he was not a communist-the
statute's prime interest-but that he was a member of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In the course of
the opinion the Court said:
Such interference with personal freedom is conspicuously
accepted when the teacher serves at the absolute will of those
to whom the disclosure must be made-those who any year can
terminate the teacher's employment without bringing charges,
without notice, without hearing, without affording an oppor-
tunity to explain. °8
No one in the Little Rock School System or the Arkansas govern-
ment admitted that they would have fired Sheldon for his NAACP
membership. But the Court took specific notice of the precarious position
of the non-tenured teacher. It undoubtedly took note of the atmopshere
surrounding the Little Rock Public Schools in 1960 (having decided
several cases concerning integration problems at those schools). It also
106. McDougal, supra note 97, at 19.
107. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
108. Id. at 486.
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had to take note of the fact that few administrators were likely to admit
that they would knowingly violate constitutional rights.
The 'Court was saying, in effect, that if the petitioner were to have a
meaningful associational freedom, it would have to draw certain implica-
tions from the state's unusual interest in the petitioner's organizational
ties. It drew those inferences and acted upon them, despite the state's
rationalization that it wanted to know how much time its employees
spent involved in organizational activities.
The task of the Court in Sheldon was to construe constitutional
provisions... so as to preserve as fully as possible both the public power
and the private right. But such is not always the case; the Court avoids
some rather delicate constitutional questions".. in favor of the broader,
more overt, violations of an individual's civil liberties. Thus in Bates v.
City of Little Rock"'. the Court held that an ordinance presumably aimed
at regulating organizations operating within the City of Little Rock for tax
purposes, although valid on its face, seriously hampered the First Amend-
ment freedoms of members of the NAACP and therefore was uncon-
stitutional. Yet in Barsky v. Board of Regents"2 a New York physician
lost his license to practice his chosen profession because he failed to produce
a financial statement of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee for a
Congressional committee. Here the public interest was claimed to out-
weigh the right to pursue a lawful calling, even though the relationship
between this public interest and the practice of medicine was very rari-
fied."' It would seem that in Barsky the. Court was "looking over its
shoulder."
When government fails to accord to a citizen his rights to function as
a citizen, then as a last resort the Court must step in." 4 Unfortunately
there is a conceptual as well as an ideological problem with the interpre-
tation-of the word "function." To function in a democratic society is to
vote, to worship, to assemble, to work, to achieve one's maximum potential
without undue restraints by the government as a result of governmental
inaction. However, all of these terms are meaningless unless the com-
plete facts surrounding an alleged infringement are considered. There
109. A parallel can be seen by examining the German system of judicial review.
McWhinney, Judicial Restraint and the West German Constitutional Court, 75 HARy. L.
REv. 5,18 (1961).
110. For example, the refusal of the Court to hear such a case as Painter v. Ban-
nister, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
111. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
112. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
113. Id.
114. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1952) ; Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Ray. 533 (1951).
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are, of necessity, certain defined limitations, but they cannot hamper
liberties implicit in the federal system. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People was not permitted to function; there
was no meaningful correlation between the purpose of the ordinance and its
application to the Association. Barsky, on the other hand, did not go to
the heart of the fundamental rights concept, but instead addressed itself
more to the regulation and discipline within a particular profession. That
there was no violation of fundamental rights in Barksy did not entirely
satisfy the dissenters. The point is that the fundamental rights versus the
state police power concept does not address itself to adequate definition or
rigid limitation.11
Barsky demonstrates a fundamental dilemma that has thus developed
in the age of technology. Can traditional jurisprudential concepts of
judicial review prevail, or must there be a gutting of the old, with a
fresh reshaping and rethinking of effective avenues of review to effectively
meet, counter, and control the positive state?..6 The community can and
does regulate individuals and groups from birth to death. Certainly the
Black man has been subjected to its whims and fancies from the time he
is born, in many cases in a segregated ward of the hospital, to his death
and burial, in many instances in a segregated corner of the graveyard.
If he is able to make a few gains through legislation he loses much through
positive and negative economic deprivation that is intermingled with
governmental largess and the positive state. The right of the Black man to
live where he wants, to secure the job of his choice, to join an association
of his professional counterparts, or to be educated without subtle economic
reprisals is in a very real sense intricately intertwined in the entire issue of
judicial abstention and possible lack of judicial creativity. As in the other
aspects of civil liberty infringement, where the Court refuses to interfere
in the more complex manifestations of a violation, it unwillingly is reen-
forcing an unfair community life style." 7
115. See, e.g., In re Anastaple, 36 U.S. 82 (1961) and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959).
116. Compare e.g., R. ENQLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL (1961) with Ferry, Must We
Rewrite the Constitution to Control Technology?, SAT. REV., Mar. 2, 1968, at 50.
117. It is clear that the equal protection clause imposes a positive duty upon the
states to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their rights. The fourteenth amend-
ment's obligation of equality extends not only to those "rights" which a state is federally
compelled to give to all of its citizens, but also to benefits the state may choose to give
to any class of citizens, however gratuitously. The state cannot circumvent this re-
quirement by enacting legislation with a face value of equality that can be applied un-
equally. The equality of legislation, as well as the equality of its administration, must
come within the purview of the equal protection clause. Yet the subtle encouragement
of some states reenforces the discrimination against the Negro. In sentencing the black
man is likely to receive a stricter sentence for the same, or similar, crime than his white
counterpart. In the South it has been argued that southern juries will usually give the
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CONCLUSION
If demands for a judicial "slowdown" are realized, then the descrip-
tion and identification of community notions of fairness will become the
exclusive domain of the political and quasi-political leaders. The focus
may or may not incorporate the idea of mutual compensation. If past
activity of the political and economic community is an example, questions
of fairness will not receive a high priority. Attempts to dilute the role of
the Court where questions of fairness are concerned are analogous to
approaching a mirror masked. The raucous voices of the post-modern
youth and the Black militants can no longer be dismissed. The voices
demand reflection and confrontation with the naked world.
The voices argue that in order to avoid the destruction of the com-
munity from without or from within a reaffirmation of the mutual com-
pensation theory must be forthcoming. The Court could play a vital role
in reasserting, authoritatively, rights and obligations of the community.
This is no utopian plea. The Court is not and cannot be a cure-all. If for no
other reason, limited jurisdictional considerations prevent it. This has
merely been a suggestion that the community consider the advisability of a
truly creative institutional force swithin before more of its members move
outside. The trouble is that the Court is thought of, and for the most
part acts like, a court-a justice of the peace court, a superior court-a law
death penalty to Negroes who rape white females. Where they have the option, they
will recommend mercy for white men who rape. If true, unequal application of the law
would be a form of the most subtle, state action. If the state fixed by statute the penalty
for a Negro who raped a white woman at death, and in like manner fixed the sentence
of white men found guilty of the same crime at life or a term of years, such action would
unquestionably violate the equal protection clause. The statistics were presented in Craig
v. State, 179 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965) and as accepted by the court showed that in the past
twenty-five years (prior to the date of the Craig case) in Florida, all sentences of death
for the crime of rape with one exception (a double pariah: homosexual who raped a
white male child, Davis v. State, 128 So. 2d 703 (Fl. 1960)) have been meted out to
Negroes. This cannot be explained by saying that white men did not rape as much as
Negroes for the statistics of the same period show that 132 white men (46 per cent ,of
the total) have been convicted of rape of 125 white and 7 Negro females. One hundred
and fifty-two Negro men were convicted for the rape of 84 white and 68 Negro females.
There was one other conviction, an Indian who raped a white female. No white man
has ever been sentenced to death for raping a Negro. No Negro has, as yet, been put to
death for raping a Negro female. (Only three have been sentenced to death, two for
raping children and only one for raping an adult Negro female. In that instance the
case was reversed by the Florida Supreme Court.) Of the 84 Negroes convicted of rap-
ing white females, 45 have been sentenced to death. Twenty-nine have already been
electrocuted. Twelve are at present awaiting execution. Compare these figures with
the fact that while white men have been found guilty of raping 132 females, including 34
children under the age of 14, the juries have failed to recommend mercy in only six cases.
Three were commuted and two convictions reversed, hence only one white man out of 132
rape cases had gone to his death for rape. See also Comment, Swain Iv. Alabama: A
Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157
(1966).
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court. But the Supreme Court is potentially much more. It represents an
untapped force that can serve the community as a genuine interpreter
whose task,
is to examine and assess [the] entire flow of prior communica-
tion for the closest possible approximation to the genuine shared
subjectivities of our present community members as to what
their Constitution really provides on basic issues." 8
As the quote suggests there can be no absolutism in discussing the
role of the Court where community fairness has been brought into issue.
At best, the Court can hope to serve the catalystic function that the Black
revolutionaries seek to achieve outside the community limits. The Court
can only hope that the branches of governmental and corporate respon-
sibility react in a positive measure.
In considering the future of the Court in the seventies, one must
consider the past failure to insist upon judicial creativity as one manner
of defining mutual compensation. This failure has caused community
and individual alike to seek messiahs with revealed doctrines or over-
simplified, glib blue-prints for community reform. If such aversion to
significant thought continues, the community can become fair game for
the totalitarian thinking that seems to be springing from both camps.
118. McDougal, supra note 67, at 5.
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